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Knowledge about knowledge since Nelson & Winter:
a mixed record*
*  This is the draft of the chapter for Lundvall and Smith (Eds.) Knowledge Creation and the
Learning Economy: new perspectives on innovation policy and knowledge management.
Comments and criticisms welcome.  I am indebted to Keith Smith for very helpful comments on
an earlier version.3
Summary
Progress in our understanding of the role of knowledge in the economy, based on Nelson and
Winter’s book published in 1982, has been mixed.  It has been greatest when their concepts have
been enriched by empirical evidence, often coming from outside evolutionary economics.  It has
been least when discussions have been mainly theoretical, and constrained within evolutionary
economics.4
The development and application of advances in knowledge have always been of central concern
to scholars of economic development and change (Loasby, 1998; Smith, 1776; Toqueville, 1840).
The purpose of this paper is to assess the progress (and lack of it), since the path-breaking book by
Nelson and Winter (1982), in our understanding of the nature, the sources and the consequences of
the processes that generate and apply the knowledge that underlies technical change.  Reflecting
its author’s professional deformation, it will be only incidentally concerned with the implications
of the advances in such understanding for orthodox economics.  Instead, I shall assess progress in
terms of improvements in empirical understanding (both description and explanation), and of
usefulness to policymakers (public and private).
I shall argue that progress has been uneven: greatest, when the concepts developed by Nelson and
Winter have been confronted by a rich body of empirical material, often emerging from traditions
outside evolutionary economics; least, when they have been constrained to mainly theoretical
debates and developments.  This would come as no surprise to the authors themselves.  The
richness of their own analysis emerged from their development of the concepts of Schumpeter and
Simon, in order to understand an observed corporate world of change, complexity and uncertainty,
largely at variance with the prevailing assumptions of economic orthodoxy.
1.  Two precursors: knowledge in production and in trade
Significant empirical challenges to orthodox assumptions began to emerge well before the
appearance of Nelson and Winter’s book.  Beginning in the 1950s, growth accounting exercises
using the aggregate production function were left with a large residual unexplained by the growth
of labour and capital.  This was often attributed to “technical advance” (Solow, 1957).  However,
many of the related assumptions were implausible, such as the prior existence of a commonly5
available stock of knowledge, bits of which are drawn upon when relative factor prices are right
(Rosenberg, 1976).  And how this stock of knowledge is created is left exogenous, in spite of
overwhelming evidence that much inventive and innovative activity is endogenous (Freeman,
1974; Schmookler, 1966)
More convincing - but now increasingly neglected – was the so-called neo-technology explanation
of patterns of international trade
1.  This emerged in the 1950s from the “Leontieff Paradox” where
the prevailing theory – that the capital-rich and labour-scarce USA should be relatively strong in
international trade in capital intensive industries – was contradicted by the facts.  Consequently,
some writers predicted that the US should be relatively strong in R & D intensive industries rather
than capital-intensive ones, and this turned out to be the case.  Subsequent analysis confirmed that
international differences in technological activities were more powerful predictors of OECD trade
performance over a wide range of manufacturing sectors than the relative abundance of labour and
capital.  Crucial to such explanations is the rejection of the orthodox assumption that all countries
have equal access to knowledge.  Indeed, it is the international differences in the knowledge of
new products and processes that creates the trade in the first place.  Such a Schumpeterian
assumption is of course readily acceptable to observers of the innovation processes.
In a world where knowledge is equated with information (i.e. costly to produce, but virtually
costless to transmit and reproduce), such trade is in theory sustainable, only if the knowledge
(information) is either kept secret or protected as intellectual property.  But how could it emerge in
the first place?  Vernon (1966) and some earlier writers argued that, while the scientific principles
underlying technology are widely understood in the industrialised world, knowledge of markets
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still tended to be parochial and national.  His explanation of international differences in innovation
was therefore essentially demand determined.
Many other of Vernon’s insights have stood up well to the test of time and experience: for
instance, his explanations of the importance of geographic agglomeration in innovative activities,
and of the dynamics of international technological diffusion – and in particular of mass production
- to developing countries.  But it is difficult to sustain – in terms of national demand – that the
technological strengths of (for example) Switzerland in marine engines and pharmaceutical
products emerge from the major demands of the Swiss Navy, and the tendencies of Swiss citizens
towards hypochondria.  More plausible explanations emerge in terms of the extension of Swiss
firms’ mastery of knowledge of machinery and of synthetic dyestuffs in textiles into other
potential fields of application.  Similar arguments can be made about patterns of technological
specialisation of many other countries.
And it is here that Nelson and Winter’s emphasis on technological regimes - the cumulative and
path-dependent nature of useful knowledge - has been a major step forward.  In addition to
information, it comprises tacit knowledge; in addition to technological knowledge it includes
organisational knowledge; and in addition to knowledge from understanding, it includes
knowledge from practice.  We shall now explore where and why these concepts have advanced
our understanding of the role of knowledge in the economy.
2. The benefits of publicly funded basic research: knowledge in papers or people?
The orthodox justification for publicly funded basic research activities used to be, and to some
extent still is, the “public good” nature of the information in the papers resulting from the
research.  It was developed in the late 1950s to support the emerging practice in the USA after the7
Second World War of large-scale public support of basic – and mainly university-based – research
(Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). In achieving this policy aim, it was – and perhaps still is – very
successful.  However, it ran increasingly into difficulties when applied to an interdependent world
with countries of different sizes and at different levels of development.  If knowledge is costless to
transmit and re-use, why can’t foreigners – who have not paid for the research – benefit from it
(the free rider problem)?  If the costs of obtaining foreign-produced knowledge are negligible,
why do many small countries in North-western Europe perform relatively more basic research
than the USA itself?  Why have successful developing countries like S. Korea and Taiwan greatly
increased their output of published papers?
Other anomalies emerged from empirical investigations.  Why do firms in science-based industries
extensively publish the results of their research when, according to the information-based view of
knowledge, they should be appropriating them by keeping them secret or protecting them through
patents?  If the output of basic research is useful, why do patents cite published papers less
frequently than its share of total R & D?  If knowledge travels so freely, why is there a national
bias in the pattern of citations in papers, patents and between the two?
Answers to only a few of these questions have come from fully paid-up members of the
evolutionary economics community, and many more from policy makers, sociologists,
bibliometricians, and eclectic and rather a-theoretical applied economists (Brooks, 1994; Callon,
1994; Hicks, 1995; Jaffe, 1989; Narin, 1992).  However, the key explanations emerge from the
wider view of knowledge expounded by Nelson and Winter.  In particular, if knowledge is
assumed to be mainly tacit and person embodied, the apparent anomalies melt away.  Knowledge
then flows mainly through person contacts and mobility, so the degree of international “leakage”
is limited by both language and by the limited degree of international mobility.  Companies8
publish papers in order to signal the fields and problems where they want to establish linkages to
the tacit knowledge of those performing related (and largely publicly funded) basic research.
Effective absorption (i.e. replication) of research results from elsewhere requires a minimum
threshold of investment in research skills, equipment and professional networks.  And the case for
public support shifts from producing information to the training of skilled problem-solvers.
However, there is now perhaps the danger that the pendulum has swung too far (Breschi and
Lissoni, 2001).  The emphasis on tacit knowledge, and the example of either the Italian regions or
Silicon Valley has led to an excessive emphasis on regional clusters of knowledge creation and
exploitation as the basis for analysis and public policy.  Whilst these are clearly important, they
are only part of the story.  Evidence suggests that the output of basic research provides for more
than the local region: in other words, Stanford University provides for more than Silicon Valley,
MIT for more than Route 128, and Cambridge University for more than its Science Park.
Reciprocally, successful clusters do not simply emerge from locating activities close together, and
they have many important knowledge linkages outside them.
Thus, we still need more systematic knowledge about how far and how quickly different types of
knowledge can travel.  Recent work by Arundel and Geuna (2001) suggests – paradoxically in the
light of orthodox theory – that firms find that the foreign knowledge they find most difficult to
acquire is so-called “public knowledge” (i.e. mainly university-based knowledge).  This is
probably because the cost and time required to join foreign, non-market knowledge networks are
greater than to acquire foreign commercial applied knowledge.  But even here, things are
changing, as multinational firms learn the managerial art of joining foreign networks of public
knowledge in fields that are competitively important (Niosi, 1999).9
3. International diffusion of technology: replication is not easy
A similar story – and similar progress – has emerged in our understanding of the nature and
determinants of the successful international transfer of technology.  The traditional assumption
used to be that such transfers require simply the transfer of embodied knowledge in machines, and
of disembodied knowledge codified in blueprints and operating instructions.  However, this has
proved untenable in the light of the very different levels of output and productivity achieved with
apparently very similar inputs. As in the case of basic research, useful productive knowledge
cannot be fully codified, but involves tacit elements – both technological and organisational – that
can be learned only through emulation and practice.  Firms and countries apparently have different
capacities to do this, and “learning” is not a simple – and often unintended – by-product of
“doing”, but a consequence of deliberate investments in activities designed to improve
performance.
In the advanced countries, the central locus of technological learning is corporate R & D activities.
The most effective innovators turned out to be the quickest imitators, and Cohen and Levinthal
(1987) have shown that corporate R & D includes both innovative and imitative activities.  Large
scale corporate R & D activities have also grown up quickly in the most successful technological
imitator countries: Japan, Korea and Taiwan.  However, painstaking case studies of technological
acquisition in industrialising countries show that R & D activities are not their major learning
activities.  Instead, they are precisely those elements of specialised learning that underpinned
earlier periods of industrialisation in the now industrialised countries: investment and production
planning, quality control, and incremental improvements in products and processes (Bell, 1984;
Lall, 1992).  Progress still needs to be made in developing methods for measuring these activities10
(see Costa and Queiroz, 2002).  And we are still far from understanding the incentives, institutions
and practices that allow some countries to “learn” and develop much more rapidly than others.
4. The dynamic capabilities of the firm: what are they?
Together with Research Policy (innovation studies), the book by Nelson and Winter is the most
highly cited in the Strategic Management Journal, reflecting its impact on the theory of the firm
and on the academic field of strategic management.  In particular, their notion of organisational
capabilities has been developed into the so-called “dynamic capabilities” theory of the firm, the
essence of which is that successful firms have organisational knowledge that enables them to
sustain their competitive advantage in a fast-changing world.  They do this by developing,
combining and sustaining difficult-to-imitate capabilities, built on their market positions,
technological paths, and organisational processes (Teece and Pisano, 1994).
Some critics argue that the theory is flawed, since it does not allow prediction: dynamic
capabilities can be identified only as a consequence of success.  In this writer’s view, this criticism
in itself is not valid.  There are many theories where prediction is not possible beginning with that
of Darwin himself.  In a complex and fast changing world, accurate predictions of future
successes, particularly when dealing with major technical changes, have on the whole proved
impossible (Schnaars and Berenson, 1986).  The identification of dynamic competencies is
inevitably itself part of a learning process, and is neither an elegant theory enabling scholars to
predict outcomes, nor a simple recipe enabling managers to achieve corporate success.
A more telling criticism of the strategic management literature in dealing with the development
and diffusion of knowledge is its excessive pre-occupation with how firms create a sustainable11
advantage in knowledge and its application (Barney, 1991; Porter, 1996).  Whilst this helps us
understand the emergence of firms exploiting fields of major technological breakthroughs (e.g.
Dupont in synthetic chemicals, Siemens in electrical and electronics, Cisco in IT), it does not help
us understand the main effects of revolutionary new technologies, which are located mainly in the
sectors using the products based on these technologies.  Here, potential applications are pervasive
because they radically reduce costs, and are disruptive because they often lower barriers to entry.
But they are also unlikely sources of sustainable advantage since they are readily available to all
competitors from suppliers.  Historical examples include the effects of electricity as a power
source on the location and operation of factories, and a major contemporary example the effects of
ICT on banking, retailing and corporate services.
5. What are innovating routines?
In spite of the apparent success of the dynamic capabilities view of the firm, the notion developed
by Nelson and Winter of “routines” (i.e. regular and predictable behavioural patterns within firms)
has not been translated into operational categories that can be useful to practitioners and to
analysts trying to deal with innovation processes in firms, or more generally with organisational
knowledge.  As I have argued elsewhere (Pavitt, 2002), this shortcoming could be remedied by
closer interaction with the rich and varied empirical literature on the management of innovation.
From this literature, it emerges that routines can best be operationalised as activities developed to
undertake essential tasks.  For example, an essential task in the large innovating firm is the
integration of specialised functional knowledge (e.g. between R & D, production and marketing).
This can be achieved by a variety of routines, ranging from inter-functional flows of information
and people to the establishment of “heavyweight” product development teams.  The main tasks12
which innovating routines must fulfil emerge from three fundamental features of innovative
activities since the industrial revolution.
•   First, there is the increasing specialisation in the production of knowledge, whether by field,
function or institution.  Hence the importance of “routines” related to knowledge networks,
knowledge co-ordination and knowledge integration, as firms progressively integrate an
increasing range of useful knowledge.
•   Second, there is the increasing complexity of artefacts, reflecting increasing scientific
understanding, but with the continuing  tendency for technological practice to run ahead – but
not too far ahead – of scientific theory and experimental techniques.  If it does, the costs of
experimentation can become prohibitively high.  Hence the continuing prevalence of routines
to deal with uncertainty, and to encourage and exploit both fundamental scientific
breakthroughs (e.g. molecular biology), and the formation of the engineering disciplines
(software engineering).  Hence also the growing importance of ICT and simulation techniques
in reducing the costs of experimentation.
•   Third, there is the continuing importance of matching specific organisational practices to the
specific characteristics of changing technologies, products and markets.  These practices
include routines for allocating resources, monitoring and control, skill and network formation,
and divisional organisation.  In established firms, failure to adapt these organisational practices
to the requirements of radically new technologies is now more likely than failure of
technological mastery itself.13
6. Industry structure and dynamics: the uneven development of knowledge
The evolutionary framework of search and selection, developed by Nelson and Winter, makes the
nature of knowledge and firms’ investment in it a central factor in explaining the size, structure
and dynamics of industries.  Studies using empirical data from the pioneering Yale Survey have
confirmed that intersectoral differences in the richness of opportunities emerging from
technological knowledge help explain intersectoral differences in the size and R & D intensity of
firms (Levin et al., 1985).  And within industries, differential rates of investment in knowledge
(i.e. R & D) between firms determine the likelihood of firms’ survival and growth (Klepper and
Simons, 1997).
Industry dynamics has also been associated with the use of dynamic search-and-select models and
simulations, often using biological techniques and metaphors.  For reasons of mathematical
convenience, simplifying assumptions are often made that are at variance with the empirical
evidence.  For example, clear distinctions are not made between firms, products and technologies
(see also section 7 below), although the evidence shows that large firms contain many products
(but fewer over time), and many technologies (but increasing over time).  Or it is assumed that
selection between products is made entirely through market competition, thereby neglecting
search and selection processes within firms.  In any event, three sets of questions deserve greater
attention.
First, why do producers’ goods sectors (e.g. machinery, instruments, applications software, and
biotechnology) have low levels of concentration, when most of the industrial dynamics literature
associates high technological opportunity with high levels of concentration?  The standard answer
is that that they have low levels of appropriability (i.e. innovators cannot capture enough of the14
benefits) and of cumulativeness (i.e. their technologies do not build on previous experience).  Why
the latter should particularly be the case with knowledge in small firms and in production
processes is not clear, and empirical observation bears this out.  An alternative explanation is that
they are technologies with pervasive applications (Freeman et al., 1982) and low costs of entry
(Marsili, 2001)
2.
This relates to the second question, namely what is the influence of vertical linkages between
industries?  Providers of capital goods (and of knowledge) often have complementary relations
with their user-industries in the dynamics of technical change.  Given the complex nature of much
useful knowledge, specialisation is not complete: both producers and users often retain
technological competencies in similar fields, in order to be able to co-ordinate interdependent
processes of technical change.  This can also increase the possibilities of entry from either users or
suppliers.  Under what conditions does this happen?  The question is all the more important, given
the growth of vertical alliances between firms with the purpose of promoting technical change.
Third, how do new product dynamics begin?  Historical studies show that new products do not
appear simply because of a flash of genius from a scientist, an engineer or an entrepreneur.  The
accumulation of prior knowledge over a wide spectrum is also a necessary input. Barras (1990)
has argued, in the case of applications of information technology in finance and banking, that the
radical product innovations that conventionally are said to start a new industry cycle are in fact
preceded by the accumulation of process innovation (i.e. a “reverse product cycle”).  Similar
processes may have been at work in electronics and machinery.  Alternatively, Geels (2002) has
used the example of the development of the steamship to propose that major technological
transitions involve (in some sort of sequence) variety and experimentation, applications in niche
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markets, and major reconfigurations in both product architecture, supporting infrastructure and
social beliefs.  Johnson and Jacobsson (2001) use similar concepts to analyse the recent emergence
of the wind turbine industry.
Finally, how and why do major technological opportunities emerge?  Uneven patterns of
technological development across fields and time not only help explain sectoral differences in
concentration and change.  They also explain why demand determined models of technical change
– and policies based upon them - are inadequate.  Unfortunately, in most writing in evolutionary
economics, the notion of technological opportunity has become nothing more than a conceptually
useful, but exogenously determined, variable.  Fortunately, the path-breaking work of Rosenberg
(1974) shows that insights into its determinants can be found in the histories of scientific and
technological developments.  They can also be found increasingly in the cognitive sciences, where
two factors influencing the speed of technological advance have been identified: first, advances in
underlying explanatory theory (e.g. modern molecular biology); second, the speed with which
prototypes can be tested (e.g. computer-based simulations) (Mahdi, 2002; Perkins, 2000)
7. Diversity in what?
Nelson and Winter recognised that evolution in an uncertain and complex environment depends on
diversity (pluralism).  This has been widely acknowledged since, both in general discourses on the
evolutionary economy, and in specific models of evolutionary processes.  However, there has
often been a fair degree of empirical imprecision in specifying what sort of diversity we are
talking about.  In our studies of the technological activities of large firms, Pari Patel and I (Patel
and Pavitt, 1997) have identified two types of diversity.16
•   Diversity between sectors in large firms’ mix of technological fields in which they have shown
competence to make progress in the state of the art.  This shows that different product groups
have different and distinctive sources of knowledge on which they draw.
•   Diversity within firms in the range of technological fields in which they have competence.
This shows that firms, and the products that they make, incorporate knowledge from a number
of technological fields, and that products must be carefully distinguished (analytically and
operationally) from technologies.
However, our studies also show the following.
•   Lack of diversity within sectors of the mix of technological fields in which competing firms
have a demonstrated competence for improvement.  This shows that firms do not compete on
the basis of technological diversity: specific bodies of knowledge are rigidly associated with
(say) designing an aircraft engine or a drug, and they are different.
This is because there is in fact very little uncertainty about the broad sources and directions of
major technological change.  Communities of practising scientists know (or soon get to know)
what is happening and what is technically feasible in, say, information storage and retrieval, gene
splicing, new materials, mechanical engineering, etc.  However, numerous case studies show a
major lack of consensus – and related uncertainties – about how technologies can be transformed
into working artefacts that are useful, and about the appropriate organisational practices to
develop, produce and sell them  (Christensen, 1997; Utterback, 1993).  It is therefore along these
dimensions – products and organisational practices, rather than technological fields – where
diversity and experimentation are likely to be the basis for competition in the contemporary
innovating firm.  In this context, the distinction made by Nelson (2000) between knowledge as
technological understanding (strong and reliable), and knowledge as organisational practice (weak
and unreliable), is particularly relevant.17
8.  Conclusions
This paper reflects mixed achievements in developing and using Nelson and Winter’s original
insights into the nature, sources and impact of knowledge.  The importance of tacit and
organisational knowledge has greatly increased understanding and improved action in three areas:
the public support of basic research; the nature of technological backwardness in a country or
region; and the sources of corporate competitiveness.  In addition, the notions of search-and-
selection, and of path-dependent and cumulative technological regimes, have been a powerful
heuristics in understanding the dynamics of industrial development and industrial structures.  In all
these cases, original concepts have been enriched and developed through strong participation in
policy debates, and through empirical studies often originating from traditions outside
evolutionary economics.
At the other extreme, the concepts of organisational routines, and of diversity, have both been
influential conceptually, but unoperational (even misleading) practically.  Research on
organisational routines has on the whole avoided systematic engagement with the rich and varied
findings of research emerging from empirical studies of innovations, organisations and working
practices.  Discussions about diversity have been mesmerised by biological metaphors and
models, and have failed to come to grips with the particular characteristics of the search and
selection environments in invention and innovation.
More recent work by Nelson (1993), Lundvall (1992) and others has developed the concept of
national systems of innovation, namely, the institutions, incentives and competencies that
influence the generation, diffusion and application of knowledge in a country.  This concept18
implicitly recognises the importance of tacit and person-embodied knowledge, the diffusion of
which is strongly influenced by distance and language.  It also recognises the importance of
specialisation in the production of knowledge, since the core of national systems of innovation is
composed of specialised institutions combining and interacting in the production, diffusion and
application of specialised knowledge.
I have argued elsewhere (Pavitt, 1998) that we have more to learn from Adam Smith than from
Schumpeter about the importance of specialisation in knowledge production.  Amongst other
things, it helps us understand some of the enduring problems of corporate knowledge
management: such as integrating specialised knowledge and functions; dealing with “tribal”
loyalties to disciplines and professions that can transform competencies into rigidities; and –as
already mentioned – distinguishing technologies from products.  And there is now plenty of
evidence from so-called strategic alliances to show that – as a consequence of increasing
specialisation – even large firms are now finding it difficult to internalise all the technological
competencies that they need.  As a consequence, the appropriate unit of analysis may no longer be
the business firm, but the knowledge-related networks in which it is embedded (Brusoni et al.,
2001; Richardson, 1972)
As for other areas for future research, the paper has tried to identify a variety of useful studies that
could be undertaken.  More generally, some of the greatest opportunities appear in neglected but
important fields, namely, in understanding the emergence (or pre-histories) of major new
industries and major new scientific breakthroughs, where greater use could be made of a relatively
old discipline (History of Science, Technology and Enterprise) and of a relatively new one
(Cognitive Science).19
Finally, we should note that the evolutionary concepts developed by Nelson and Winter have
proved most valuable to our understanding of the nature and policy implications of what has come
to be called the knowledge economy, when they have been open to problems and empirical results
emerging from a variety of disciplines.  A more closed system might have the virtues of greater
coherence and (formal) analytical rigour.  But its relevance to the rest of the world could become
open to doubt.
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